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Abstract
We present a logic for reasoning about licenses, which are “terms of use” for digital re-
sources. The logic provides a language for writing both properties of licenses and specifications
that govern a client’s actions. We discuss the complexity of checking properties and specifica-
tions written in our logic and propose a technique for verification. A key feature of our approach
is that it is essentially parameterized by the language in which the licenses are written, provided
that this language can be given a trace-based semantics. We consider two license languages to
illustrate this flexibility.
1 Introduction
In the world of digital rights management, licenses are agreements between the distributors and
consumers of digital resources. A license is issued by an owner to a prospective client. It states the
exact conditions under which a particular resource may be used, including a complete description
of how compensation may be given. Licenses can be viewed as a subset of authorization policies,
policies that dictate what actions a system’s principal can perform at any given time. Licenses are
an essential part of any rights management system, because they tell the consumer, as well as the
enforcement mechanism, which uses are legitimate.
Licenses must be written in some language. Although many licenses are very simple (e.g.,
“consumer must pay a fee before each access to an on-line journal”), more complicated ones, in
particular ones involving time, are also common (e.g., “for each month from 1/1/01 to 1/1/02 the
mortgage requires either a $1500 payment between the first and fourth of the month or a $1525
payment between the fourth and the fourteenth”). The language must be expressive enough to
capture these types of licenses. Languages such as DPRL [Ramanujapuram and Ram 1998], XrML
[ContentGuard, Inc. 2000], and ODRL [IPR Systems Pty Ltd 2001] have been developed to state
a wide range of licenses. These languages, however, do not have formal semantics. Instead, they
rely on intuitions behind their syntax, and on informal descriptions of expected behavior. As a
consequence, licenses that “seem right” are enforced without anyone knowing precisely what is
intended or exactly what is allowed.
Gunter et al. [2001] used techniques from programming language semantics [Hoare 1985] to
remove these ambiguities. In their approach, the meaning of a license is a set of traces. Each trace
∗This paper is essentially the same as one that appeared in the Proceedings of the 15th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, pp. 282–294, 2002.
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represents a sequence of actions allowed by the license. A correct enforcement mechanism permits
any sequence of action specified by the license and forbids any other. To illustrate their idea, Gunter
et al. defined a simple language with semantics that could be used to state a number of licenses
precisely.
In addition to unambiguously expressing licenses, we would like to reason about them. In
general, we are interested in two classes of questions: does a set of licenses have certain properties
and does a client’s actions with respect to a set of licenses meet particular specifications. Note that
we make a distinction between the characteristics inherent in a set of licenses (properties, sometimes
referred to as license properties for emphasis). and those whose truth depends on the client’s actions
(specifications, sometimes referred to as client behavior specifications for emphasis) Examples of
properties include “a religious work may only be viewed during the hour before sunset” and “if a
user accesses a work, then the user is obligated to pay for the access at some time.” Depending on
the licenses, each property may or may not be easy to check. Continuing the last example, an owner
may allow a client to defer payment in so many situations that it is not clear that there will ever
be an occasion when the client must pay. Alternatively, a license may permit free access to some
resources, however, the license has so much “red tape” that the client cannot determine if the desired
resource actually is free. As for specifications, examples include “the client never uses a resource
illegally” and “the client is never obligated to pay interest on her credit card debt”. The difficulty
of specification checking is based on the licenses and the client’s actions. Verifying properties and
specifications is important, because it increases our confidence that the licenses match the informal
requirements and that the informal requirements match the owner’s intent.
In this paper we present a logic for reasoning about licenses that provides us with a language
in which we can state properties and specifications precisely. The logic is essentially a temporal
logic. It allows us to make statements about issued licenses, assuming the licenses are written in
some particular language that is distinct from our logic. For ease of exposition, we assume until
Section 4 that licenses are written in a very simple, regular language and that the application has
only one client and one provider. Our framework can be modified in a straightforward manner to
reason about different license languages. It is also easy to extend the logic to multiple clients and
providers.
As the examples suggest, license properties and client behavior specifications typically involve
the client’s permissions and obligations to do certain actions. We take a very simple view of per-
missions and obligations. In particular, we focus exclusively on the client’s viewpoint. Inspired
by Gunter et al., we interpret licenses as describing a set of legal sequences of actions. A client is
permitted to do an action if that action is part of a sequence of actions that is legal according to the
actions she has already done and the licenses issued. If there is only one such action for a particular
license, then the client is obligated to do that action.
To illustrate our notions of permission and obligation, consider the mortgage example in which
the client must pay either $1500 between the first and fourth or $1525 between the fourth and the
fourteenth of every month from 1/1/01 to 1/1/02. For the first month, there are two legal action
sequences. The client could pay $1500 before the fourth. Alternatively, the client could pay $1525
between the fourth and the fourteenth. Since there is a legal action sequence in which the client pays
before the fourth and one in which the client does not, we say that the client is permitted, but not
obligated, to make the earlier payment. If the client doesn’t make the earlier payment, then the only
legal sequence she can be following is the second one. In this case, she is obligated to complete that
sequence by paying $1525 before the fourteenth.
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Why are we designing a logic for reasoning about licenses? A logic provides us with a formal
language in which to write properties and specifications. In addition, it allows us to check in a
provably correct way that a property or specification holds for a particular set of licenses and, in
the case of specification, a client’s behavior. We can automate the analysis, by developing model
checking techniques. It turns out that standard model checking procedures (as given in [Clarke,
Grumberg, and Peled 1999]) apply to our framework. These procedures can form the foundation of
enforcement mechanisms that are well-grounded in formal methods.
The design of our logic was strongly influenced by the work of Halpern and van der Meyden
[2001a, 2001b] on reasoning about SPKI/SDSI. It is also reminiscent of deontic logic approaches,
which aim at reasoning about ideal and actual behavior [Meyer and Wieringa 1993]. Deontic logic
has been used extensively to analyze the structure of normative law and normative reasoning in law.
(For examples, please see [Wieringa and Meyer 1993] and the references therein.)
In the next section, we introduce our logic. Section 3 examines the complexity of checking
that a license property or client behavior specification holds. In Section 4, we show that our logic
can be adapted to different license languages, by replacing our regular language with a variant of
DigitalRights [Gunter, Weeks, and Wright 2001]. We discuss related work in Section 5. Proofs of
our technical results can be found in the appendix.
2 The logic
We want to reason about licenses and client’s actions with respect to licenses. To do this, we in-
troduce a logic, Llic , that allows us to talk about licenses and actions. Formulas in Llic include
permission and obligation operators, as well as temporal operators, because we want to write for-
mulas that represent interesting properties and specifications; the ones that state the conditions under
which actions are permitted or obligatory. In this section, we give the syntax for our logic, followed
by its semantics.
2.1 Syntax
The syntax of Llic has three categories; formulas (ϕ,ψ, . . . ), actions (α, . . . ), and licenses (ℓ, . . . ).
Their definitions assume a set Names of license names, a set Works of works (i.e. resources),
and a set Devices of devices (i.e. ways to access resources). Actions are taken from a set Act =
{render[w, d] : w ∈ Works , d ∈ Devices} ∪ {pay[x] : x ∈ R} ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ represents the
null or “do nothing” action. (For simplicity, we consider only render and pay actions, as was done
in [Gunter, Weeks, and Wright 2001].) Also, we let Lic be the set of licenses ℓ. In the following
formal description, n ∈ Names and a ∈ Act .
ϕ ::= n : ℓ | α | Pα | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ |©ϕ | ✷ϕ | ϕ1 Uϕ2
α ::= (a, n) | (a, n)
ℓ ::= a | ℓ1 ℓ2 | ℓ
∗ | ℓ1 ∪ ℓ2
Intuitively, n : ℓ means “the license whose legitimate action sequences are described by the regular
expression ℓ is being issued now and will be referred to by the name n.” The primitive action (a, n)
means “action a is performed with respect to license named n”. The action (a, n) represents any
action-name pair where the action is not a, but the license name is n. Pα indicates that the action
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expression α is permitted. The set of formulas are closed under ∧, ¬, ✷, © and U , which are
well-known operators from classical and temporal logic [Goldblatt 1992].1 We use the standard
abbreviations ϕ ∨ ψ for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), ϕ⇒ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ✸ϕ for ¬✷¬ϕ. Also, we abbreviate
the action (a, n) as an. For instance, (render[w, d], n) is written rendern[w, d], and (⊥, n) is written
⊥n.
We use the abbreviation O(a, n) to stand for ¬P (a, n). As we shall see later, the interpretation
of O(a, n) is that the client is obligated to perform action a with respect to the license named n.
To illustrate how our logic can be used in practice, consider the following scenario. Suppose
an owner of an on-line journal requires a fee to be paid before each access. This license ℓ can be
written in our logic as:
ℓ = ((pay[fee](⊥)∗render[journal, d]) ∪⊥)∗,
where d is the device that the client uses to access the journal. Assuming the license is labeled n,
the property that the client is not obligated to access the journal immediately after paying the fee
can be written as:
payn[fee]⇒ ©(¬Orendern[journal, d]).
The specification that the client doesn’t violate the license can be written as the family of formulas:
n : ℓ⇒ ✷[(α⇒ (Pα)) ∧ ((Oα)⇒ α)],
where α ∈ {payn[fee], rendern[journal, d],⊥n}. In other words, the client only does legitimate
actions and does every action that is required by the license once it is issued. As a final example, we
can write that, during one time period, the client pays $1500 on the mortgage m, but doesn’t pay
the journal fee as:
paym[1500] ∧ payn[fee].
2.2 Semantics
To formalize the intuitions given above, we base our semantics on the notion of a run. When
defining a run, we make the standard assumption that time is discrete and can, in fact, be represented
using nonnegative integers. A run r associates each time t with a pair (L,A), where L is the set
of named licenses issued at that time (a named license is a pair (n, ℓ) of a name n and a license
ℓ), and A is a function giving, for each license name n, an action A(n) performed by the client
at that time (or ⊥ if no action was performed with respect to n). Formally, a run is a function
r : N −→ ℘(Names × Lic) × ActNames such that no name is paired with more than one license
throughout the entire run. Recall that ActNames is the set of all functions from Names to Act . Our
approach imposes the restriction that, at most, one action per time per named license can occur. We
do not need this limitation, but it simplifies the exposition. In essence, we are trading the ability
to handle the class of licenses where a client must do multiple actions simultaneously for a simple
definition of a license where concurrent actions are not handled. For notational convenience, given
a run r and time t with r(t) = (L,A), we define lic(r, t) to be the set of named licenses issued
in run r at time t, that is, lic(r, t) = L; similarly, we define act(r, t) to be the set of action and
license name pairs performed in run r at time t, that is, act(r, t) = {(A(n), n) : n ∈ Names}.
1Recall that ✷ϕ means “ϕ holds now and at all future times”, ©ϕ means “ϕ holds at the next time”, and ϕ1 Uϕ2
means “ϕ2 eventually holds and, until it does, ϕ1 holds”.
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Finally, we say that a license (n : ℓ) is active at time t in run r if there exists a time t′ ≤ t such that
(n : ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t′)
While a run captures the client’s actions, an interpretation states what is permitted. Formally, a
permission interpretation P is a function P : N −→ ℘(Act×Names) that is used to give a meaning
to permissions. Intuitively, if (a, n) ∈ P (t) then at time t, the client is permitted to perform action
a with respect to license name n. In other words, the client is allowed to do an an action.
We want the interpretation of permissions to match the permissions implied by the run. To
define this requirement formally, we first give a mapping that relates licenses to action sequences.
We then use this mapping to find the permission interpretation that permits an action if and only if
the run implies the permission.
Following the lead of Gunter et al. [2001], we associate each license with a set of traces. In our
discussion, a trace refers to a sequence of actions.2 The notation s1 · s2 denotes the concatenation
of two sequences of actions s1 and s2 where s1 · s2 = s1 if s1 is infinite. A trace s1 is said to be a
prefix of trace s2 if there is some trace s such that s1 · s = s2.
We construct a function L[[ℓ]] by induction on the structure of a given license ℓ:
L[[a]] = {a}
L[[ℓ1 ℓ2]] = {s1 · s2 : s1 ∈ L[[ℓ1]] and s2 ∈ L[[ℓ2]]}
L[[ℓ1 ∪ ℓ2]] = L[[ℓ1]] ∪ L[[ℓ2]]
L[[ℓ∗]] =
⋃
n≥0
{s1 · . . . · sn : si ∈ L[[ℓ]]}.
The function L[[ℓ]] gives the set of traces allowed by the license. We define the function I[[ℓ]] to pro-
vide the infinitary version of the sequences corresponding to ℓ, by essentially appending infinitely
many ⊥ actions at the end of each sequence. Formally, I[[ℓ]] = {s · ⊥∞ : s ∈ L[[ℓ]]}. Finally, a
sequence of action s is said to be viable for ℓ if s is a prefix of some trace in I[[ℓ]].
We are now ready to define the interpretation Pr corresponding to run r. Given a named license
(n, ℓ) issued at time t1 in a run r, the action-sequence of n up to time t2, denoted r[n, t2], is the
sequence a0a1 · · · at2−t1−1 such that:
ai =
{
a if (a, n) ∈ act(r, t1 + i)
⊥ otherwise.
Since we restricted a run to only allow one action per license per time unit, the notion of an action-
sequence is well-defined. The interpretation Pr corresponding to a run r is defined as follows. For
all times t ≥ 0, Pr(t) is the smallest set such that for all license names n ∈ Names and actions
a ∈ Act , (⊥, n) ∈ P (t) if the license (n, ℓ) is not active and (a, n) ∈ P (t) if the license is active
and r[n, t] · a is viable for ℓ.
To understand the meaning of an action expression, α, we need a way to associate it with name-
action pairs. We do this by defining a mapping A[[α]] from expressions to sets of pairs. Clearly,
an action expression (a, n) should be mapped to the pair (a, n). The complement action (a, n) is
mapped to the set of actions different from a, but associated with the same license name n. Formally,
A[[(a, n)]] = {(a, n)}
A[[(a, n)]] = {(b, n) | b 6= a}.
2Gunter et al. use the term reality for this concept, although their formal definition is different.
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Contrary to intuition, we do not associate the complement of a name-action pair with the largest set
of name action pairs that does not include it. This mapping has unfortunate consequences, because
it ignores the intuitive independence between licenses. For example, it allows us to deduce that the
client can do any action with respect to any license other than the mortgage, if the client is permitted
to not make a mortgage payment. Statements concerning one set of licenses should not be used to
deduce anything about any other license.
As an example of our approach, recall the situation in which the client pays $1500 on the
mortgage, but doesn’t pay the journal fee. The action expressions α1 and α2 used to express these
actions are paym[1500] and ¬payn[fee], respectively. Applying the above definition, A[[α1]] =
{(pay[1500],m)}, and A[[α2]] = {(a, n) : a 6= pay[fee]}. Hence, the actions α1 and α2 mean that
“the client is paying $1500 with respect to m and doing some action other than paying the fee with
respect to n”.
We now define what it means for a formula ϕ to be true (or satisfied) at a run r at time t, written
r, t |= ϕ, by induction on the structure of ϕ:
r, t |= n : ℓ if (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t),
r, t |= α if ∃(a, n) ∈ A[[α]] s.t. (a, n) ∈ act(r, t),
r, t |= Pα if ∃(a, n) ∈ A[[α]] s.t. (a, n) ∈ Pr(t),
r, t |= ©ϕ if r, t+ 1 |= ϕ,
r, t |= ✷ϕ if for all t′ ≥ t, r, t′ |= ϕ,
r, t |= ϕUψ if ∃t′ ≥ t s.t. r, t′ |= ψ and r, t′′ |= ϕ for all t′′ with t′ > t′′ ≥ t,
r, t |= ¬ϕ if r, t 6|= ϕ,
r, t |= ϕ ∧ ψ if r, t |= ϕ and r, t |= ψ.
If a formula ϕ is true at all times in a run r, we say ϕ is valid in r and write r |= ϕ. If ϕ is valid
in all runs r, we simply say ϕ is valid and write |= ϕ. 3
Various properties of permission (P ) and obligation (¬P (a, n)) follow from the above seman-
tics. In particular, we can see that O(a, n) is true in a run r at time t if and only if (a, n) is the
only action-name pair in Pr(t). In other words, an action is obligated if and only if it is the only
permitted action. This is a consequence of the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1: For all action expressions (a, n), the formula P (a, n) ∨ P (a, n) is valid.
3In an earlier version of this paper [Pucella and Weissman 2002], we considered two related semantics for formulas,
in the spirit of the logics presented by Halpern and van der Meyden [2001a, 2001b]. The first semantics, called the open
semantics, was defined with respect to an arbitrary interpretation P . The second semantics, called the closed semantics,
was defined from the open semantics by taking the minimal interpretation, as we do in this paper. Intuitively, the closed
semantics assumes that the run contains all the information relevant to interpret the formulas. This is often referred to
as the closed-world assumption. In other words, if a permission is not implied by the run, then it is not permitted. In
contrast, the open semantics admits that the run may not encode all the information, and therefore one cannot infer that
an action is not permitted simply because it is not implied by the run.
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Hence, if P (a, n) is not true at a point, P (a, n) must be true. Another consequence of the above
proposition is that O(a, n) ⇒ P (a, n) is valid. These properties show that our operators P and O,
although defined exclusively from the traces of the licenses issues in a run, satisfy some of the clas-
sical properties of deontic logic operators, as given for instance in [Follesdal and Hilpinen 1981].
These properties are a consequence of our prescribed semantics and, as such, suggest a certain deon-
tic interpretation. In particular, the validity of O(a, n) ⇒ P (a, n) indicates that obligation should
be read as “must” and not as “ought”. It also reflects the fact that we cannot express conflicting
prohibitions and obligations in our framework.
2.3 Encoding finite runs and licenses
In this section, we show that any run can be “encoded” as a formula in our logic, provided that the
run is finite. By finite, we intuitively mean that nothing happens after a given time, and each time
instant, only finitely many licenses are issued and non-⊥ actions are performed. Formally, a run r
is finite if there exists a natural number tf such that :
• for all t ≤ tf , lic(r, t) is finite,
• for all t ≤ tf , {n : (a, n) ∈ act(r, t), a 6= ⊥} is finite,
• for all t > tf , lic(r, t) = ∅, and
• for all t > tf , (a, n) ∈ act(r, t) implies a = ⊥.
For convenience, we write ©kϕ for the formula © · · ·©ϕ that has k occurences of the ©
operator before ϕ. Given a finite run r, define Nr to be the set of license names issued in r.
Formally, Nr = {n : ∃t, ℓ.(n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t)}. Define
ψr = ψ0 ∧©ψ1 ∧©
2ψ2 ∧ · · · ∧©
tfψtf ∧©
tf+1✷ψe,
where tf is the last time “something happened” in the run, ψe is
∧
n∈Nr
(⊥, n), and ψt, which
encodes the state of the run at time t, is:
ψt =
∧
(a,n)∈act(r,t)
n∈Nr
(a, n) ∧
∧
(n,ℓ)∈lic(r,t)
n : ℓ.
Finally, let Nϕ be the set of license names appearing in formula ϕ, defined in the obvious way. The
following proposition formalizes the fact that ψr captures the important aspects of the run r.
Proposition 2.2: If r is a finite run and Nϕ ⊆ Nr, then r, t |= ϕ iff |= ψr ⇒ ©tϕ.
It is interesting to note that ψr does not specify explicitly the permissions implied by the run.
Intuitively, this is because the information encoded in ψr is sufficient for the permissions to be
uniquely determined. To formalize this intuition, we show the more general result that issuing a
license results in the client’s actions implying a particular set of permissions.
We use some notation from the theory of regular languages to formalize the general result.
Specifically, we let ǫ represent the empty action sequence and we extend the set of licenses to
include 0 and 1 where L[[0]] = ∅ and L[[1]] = {ǫ}. We also define complementary functions
S(ℓ) and Da(ℓ) where ℓ is a regular expression. For any action sequence a0, a1, . . . , an ∈ L[[ℓ]],
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S(ℓ) is the set of actions containing a0 and Da0(ℓ) is a regular expression such that a1, . . . , an ∈
L[[Da0(ℓ)]]. Formally, S(0) = ∅, S(1) = ∅, S(a) = {a}, S(ℓ1ℓ2) = S(ℓ1) if ǫ 6∈ L[[ℓ1]] and
S(ℓ1) ∪ S(ℓ2) otherwise, S(ℓ1 ∪ ℓ2) = S(ℓ1) ∪ S(ℓ2), and S(ℓ∗) = S(ℓ). Da(ℓ) is called the
Brzozowski derivative of ℓwith respect to a [Brzozowski 1964]. Its formal definition is: Da(a) = 1,
Da(b) = 0,Da(ℓ1ℓ2) = Da(ℓ1)ℓ2 if ǫ 6∈ L[[ℓ1]] and (Da(ℓ1)ℓ2)∪(Da(ℓ2)) otherwise, Da(ℓ1∪ℓ2) =
Da(ℓ1) ∪Da(ℓ2), and Da(ℓ∗) = Da(ℓ)ℓ.
Given these definitions, we inductively define a family of formulas for each named license
(n, ℓ). For any action sequence a0a1 · · · an ∈ L[[ℓ]], the formulas say that a0 is permitted and if
the client does the action sequence a0 · · · ai−1, then the client is permitted to do ai in i time steps.
Formally:
ϕ0n,ℓ =
∧
a∈S(ℓ)
P (a, n)
ϕi+1n,ℓ =
∧
a∈S(ℓ)
(
P (a, n) ∧
(
(a, n)⇒ ©ϕin,Da(ℓ)
))
.
The following proposition formalizes the intuition that by issuing a license, we force the client’s
actions to imply a particular set of permissions.
Proposition 2.3: For any license ℓ, the formulas n : ℓ⇒ ϕin,ℓ are valid, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Hence, if the formula ψr represents the finite run r in the sense of Proposition 2.2, then every
named license (n, ℓ) issued in run r will imply the formulas ϕin,ℓ, as per Proposition 2.3. Because
the conjunction of the actions specified in ψr and the formula ϕin,ℓ implies the permissions that
hold for run r for i time steps, Proposition 2.2 is true even though ψr does not specify permissions
explicitly.
3 Satisfiability and verification
In this section, we examine the complexity of reasoning using Llic and discuss a technique for auto-
matically checking if a client behavior specification is satisfied in a given run. As we mentionned in
the introduction, we are fundamentally interested in two classes of questions does a set of licenses
have certain properties and does a client’s actions with respect to a set of licenses meet particular
specifications. The first question can be rephrased as “does a set of licenses imply a property, re-
gardless of what the client does, which licences are issued, and when the licenses are issued?”. In
other words, the first question corresponds to asking if a formula in our logic is valid (i.e., true in
all runs). The second question can be rephrased as “does a specification hold for a given sequence
of client actions and licenses issued?” In other words, the second question corresponds to asking if
a formula in our logic is true in a given run.
To answer the first question, we investigate the complexity of our satisfiability problem (i.e. the
problem of determining for any given Llic formula ϕ if there exists a run r and a time t such that
r, t |= ϕ). We can reduce the satisfiability problem for our logic to the satisfiability problem for
a “simpler” logic, Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), which is well-known in the formal verification
community. LTL is essentially a propositional logic with temporal operators. To distinguish the
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LTL operators from the temporal operators in Llic , we use CTL syntax for LTL. Specifically, an
LTL formula F is defined as:
F ::= p | F1 ∧ F2 | ¬F |XF |GF | F1UF2
where p is a primitive proposition, XF means that F holds at the next time, GF means that F
holds now and at all future times, and F1UF2 means that F2 eventually holds and, until it does, F1
holds. Models for LTL are linear structures of the form M = (S,L), where S = {s0, s1, s2, . . . } is
a set of states and L assigns to every state in S the primitive propositions that are true in that state.
The definition of the satisfiability of an LTL formula F in a linear structure M at state s, written
M,s |=L F , is straightforward. We refer to [Clarke, Grumberg, and Peled 1999] for more detail.
The key property of LTL that we will use is that the satisfiability problem for LTL is PSPACE-
complete [Sistla and Clarke 1985].
It is straightforward to encode a formula F in LTL as a formula ϕ in Llic in such a way that F
is satisfiable if and only if ϕ is satisfiable. Therefore, the satisfiability problem for Llic is PSPACE-
hard. What is more interesting is that there is a polynomial reduction from the satisfiability problem
for Llic to the satisfiability problem for LTL. At the heart of this reduction is a way to encode our
logic into LTL.
The first step of the reduction is to show that if a formula ϕ is satisfiable in Llic , then it can
be translated into a satisfiable formula ϕT in LTL. We will do this directly, by showing that we
can in fact transform the run r in which ϕ is true into a linear structure Mr in which ϕT is true.
Let Φ0 be the set of primitive propositions that we will use in our formula encoding, inclduing
primitive propositions issued(n, ℓ) for every name n and license ℓ, and done(a, n), permitted(a, n)
and obligated(a, n) for each action a and name n.
Given a run r, we construct a linear model Mr = (S,L) where S = {s0, s1, s2, . . . }. For each
state st, which corresponds to the run at time t, L(st) is defined as the smallest set such that:
• if (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t), then issued(n, ℓ) ∈ L(st),
• if (a, n) ∈ act(r, t), then done(a, n) ∈ L(st),
• if (a, n) ∈ Pr(t), then permitted(a, n) ∈ L(st),
• if (a, n) ∈ Pr(t) is the only action associated with license name n in Pr(t), then obligated(a, n) ∈
L(st).
Given this structure Mr, it should be clear how to translate a Llic formula ϕ true in r into a formula
ϕT true in Mr. In particular, the following translation works:
• (n : ℓ)T = issued(n, ℓ).
• (a, n)T = done(a, n) and (a, n)T = ¬done(a, n).
• (P (a, n))T = permitted(a, n) and (P (a, n))T = ¬obligated(a, n).
• (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
T = ϕT1 ∧ ϕ
T
2 and (¬ϕ)T = ¬ϕT .
• (©ϕ)T = XϕT , (✷ϕ)T = GϕT , and (ϕ1 Uϕ2)T = ϕT1UϕT2 .
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It is straightforward to see that the above translations preserve the truth of the formula. In fact,
something stronger holds, which will be useful later in this section:
Proposition 3.1: r, t |= ϕ iff Mr, st |=L ϕT .
This means that if ϕ is satisfiable in our logic, then ϕT is satisfiable in LTL. However, the converse
does not hold. In particular, ϕT may be satisfiable in an LTL structure that does not correspond
to any run. We somehow need a way to restrict the LTL structures considered, to ensure that they
correspond to runs in Llic . Intuitively, we need to account in LTL for the notions that are implicit
in the Llic semantics. In particular, we must enforce our requirements that two actions are never
done for the same license at the same time, two licenses are never labeled with the same name, an
obligation implies exactly one action is permitted for the license, a client is only permitted to do
actions other than ⊥ for active licenses, and issuing a license implies various facts as discussed in
Section 2.3. It is easy to state all but the last of these in LTL.
Since we will only need to satisfy the above restrictions as they pertain to a given formula ϕ, we
enforce those restrictions over the actions, license names, and licenses appearing in ϕ. In general,
let A be a finite set of actions, N be a finite set of license names, and L be a finite set of named
licenses. The restriction that at most one action is done per license name per time is expressed by
the following LTL formula DoneA,N :
G
∧
a∈A
n∈N

done(a, n)⇒ ∧
a′∈A
a′ 6=a
¬
(
done(a′, n)
) .
The restriction that a license name in N is never associated with more than one license in L is
expressed by the LTL formula IssuedL:
G
∧
(n,ℓ)∈L

issued(n, ℓ)⇒ ∧
(n′,ℓ′)∈L
n′=n
G¬(issued(n′, ℓ′))

 .
The restriction that obligation is an abbreviation for only being allowed to do one action with respect
to a license is expressed by the LTL formula OblA,N :
G
∧
a∈A
n∈N


obligated(a, n)⇔
 permitted(a, n)∧∧
a′∈A
a′ 6=a
¬(permitted(a′, n)))



 .
The restriction that a client can only do ⊥ actions with respect to an unissued license is expressed
by the LTL formula UnissuedL:∧
(n,ℓ)∈L
(obligated(⊥, n)U issued(n, ℓ)) .
To state the consequences of issuing a named license (n, ℓ), we first construct a nondetermin-
istic finite automaton (NFA) that accepts the same language as ℓ (when ℓ is viewed as a regular
10
expression), and encode the transition relation of the automaton as an LTL formula. Formally, we
construct the ǫ-free NFA representing ℓ as An = (Qn,∆n, Sn, Fn) where Qn is the set of states,
∆n is the transition function, Sn are the start states, and Fn are the final states. For convenience, we
will write ∆n(q) for {a : ∃q′ ∈ Qn.(q, a, q′) ∈ ∆n} and ∆n(q, a) for {q′ : (q, a, q′) ∈ ∆n}. We
assume that we have primitive propositions in Φ0 to represent the states of the automaton, namely
instate(n, q) for all q ∈ Qn, and a primitive proposition over(n) to represent the fact that we have
stopped taking transitions in the automaton (for instance, because the client performed an action
that was not permitted). The “effect” of taking a transition (from a finite set A of actions) in a state
q of An can be represented by the following LTL formula TransA,q:
instate(n, q)⇒

∧
a∈∆n(q)
(permitted(a, n))∧
∧
a∈∆n(q)

 done(a, n)⇒∨
q′∈∆(q,a)
X(instate(n, q′))

∧
∧
a∈A
a 6∈∆n(q)
(¬permitted(a, n))∧
∧
a∈A
a 6∈∆n(q)
done(a, n)⇒ X(over(n))


.
We also need a statement to the effect that the automaton An can only be in one state at any
given time, or in a state satisfying over. This is expressed by the following LTL formula States:(
over(n)⇒
∧
q∈Qn
¬instate(n, q)
)
∧
∧
q∈Qn


instate(n, q)⇒
¬over(n) ∧ ∧
q′∈Qn
q′ 6=q
¬instate(n, q′)



 .
The encoding of the NFA An is then expressed by the following LTL formula NFAn,ℓ,A, which
asserts the initial states of the automaton, as well as encoding all the transitions, including the
transitions from the states where over(n) holds:( ∨
q∈Sn
instate(n, q)
)
∧G(States)∧
G
( ∧
q∈Qn
TransA,q∧
(over(n)⇒ (obligated(⊥, n) ∧X(over(n))))
)
.
The restriction that issuing a license implies the consequences described by the corresponding
NFA is therefore expressed by the LTL formula LicL,A:
G
∧
(n,ℓ)∈L
(issued(n, ℓ)⇒ NFAn,ℓ,A).
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Note that the formula corresponding to the NFA construction guarantees that only the ⊥ action is
allowed for a completed license.
We now associate with every Llic formula ϕ the LTL formula ϕI that captures all the implicit
restrictions required for our treatment of ϕ. Recall from Section 2.3 that Nϕ represents the set
of license names appearing in ϕ. In a similar way, define Aϕ to be the set of actions explicitely
appearing in ϕ, and define Lϕ to be the set of named licenses appearing in ϕ (i.e., occurrences of
the n : ℓ formula). We take ϕI to be:
DoneAϕ,Nϕ ∧ IssuedLϕ ∧ OblAϕ,Nϕ ∧ UnissuedLϕ ∧ LicLϕ,Aϕ .
We can formally verify that the formula ϕI does indeed capture the implicit restrictions imposed by
the semantics of Llic , as far as they pertain to formula ϕ. We can show:
Proposition 3.2: If M,s |=L ϕT ∧ ϕI , then there exists a run r such that r, 0 |= ϕ.
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 can be used to derive the following characterization of the complexity
of the logic:
Theorem 3.3: The satisfiability problem for Llic is PSPACE-complete.
Since a formula ϕ is valid if and only if ¬ϕ is not satisfiable, a corollary of Theorem 3.3 is that
determining if a formula ϕ of our logic is valid is also a PSPACE-complete problem.
It is much easier to answer our second question. The above discussion in fact hints at a suitable
approach: we reduce the model-checking problem for our logic to one for LTL and then apply
existing verification technology developed for LTL. More specifically, we translate the run (and
associated minimial interpretation Pr) into a linear structure with a state for each time and atomic
propositions for the licenses issued, client actions, permissions and obligation.
We restrict our attention to finite runs, as defined in Section 2.3, because we want to give an
algorithm for deciding if a formula holds in a given model. (In practice, we expect to have a de-
scription of client behavior for a period of time and we want to establish permissions or obligations
given that behavior; this can be modeled with a finite run.) The idea is simply to use the construc-
tion of the LTL structure Mr as given earlier, and use Proposition 3.1. The only problem is that
the construction of Mr assumes that we have the permission interpretation Pr. To construct Mr
efficiently, we need a way to compute Pr efficiently. For each named license (n, ℓ) (finitely many
by assumption), we construct an NFA that accepts the language represented by ℓ. We associate a
subset of the NFA’s states with every time t after the license is issued. Specifically, the NFA’s initial
states are associated with the time when the license is issued. The states associated with any later
time t+1 is the set of states that can be reached by one transition from a state associated with time t.
For every time t after the license is issued, the set of permitted actions Pr,n(t) is the set of possible
transitions from the states associated with t. Finally, for any time t, Pr(t) is the union of Pr,n(t) for
all licenses named n issued by time t. This procedure constructs Pr,n(t) in polynomial time with
respect to the size of the run.
Proposition 3.4: There exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing the interpretation Pr
corresponding to a finite run r.
Combining the computation of Pr from r with the construction of the model Mr given ear-
lier and applying known LTL model-checking techniques, model checking can be done reasonably
efficiently, at least for a small specification ϕ:
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Theorem 3.5: There exists an algorithm for deciding if a formula ϕ is true in a finite run r at time
t. Furthermore, the algorithm runs in polynomial time with respect to the size of the model r and in
exponential time with respect to the size of the formula ϕ.
A straightforward modification to the above procedure would allow us to check the validity of a
formula ϕ in a run r (i.e., check that ϕ holds throughout the run).
Proposition 3.6: r |= ϕ iff Mr, s0 |=L G(ϕT ).
Finally, note that the model Mr is constructed without regard to the formula ϕ whose truth
value we want to check. Therefore, we can construct Mr once and use it to model-check different
formulas, each translated to LTL, against the run r.
4 Handling different license languages
In discussing our logic thus far, we have assumed that the licenses are written in a regular language.
Although a regular language has the benefits of being well-known, simple, and fairly expressive,
it is not difficult to imagine settings in which another license language is more appropriate. A key
feature of our logic is that it can be adapted in a straight-forward way to reason about licenses that
are written in any language that has trace-based semantics. To illustrate this flexibility, we will
modify our logic to handle the licenses presented in Gunter et al. [2001].
For ease of exposition, we consider a restricted version of DigitalRights [Gunter, Weeks, and
Wright 2001].4 The syntax of licenses is given by the following grammar:
e ::= (for p | for [upto]m p)
pay x (upfront | flatrate | peruse)
forW on D
where p is a period of time (a number of time units), x is a payment amount, W is a subset of works
and D is a subset of devices. The terms upfront, flatrate and peruse refer to the payment schedule.
The upfront schedule requires payment at the beginning of the time period. The flatrate and peruse
schedules require payment at the end of the time period. The difference between the two is that
the payment for flatrate does not depend on the number of renderings, while the one for peruse
does. If we let H be a payment schedule (upfront, flatrate or peruse), then a license of the form
for p pay x H for W on D means that for the time period indicated by p, the client is required to
pay x, according to schedule H , in order to render any of the works in W on a device in D. Instead
of beginning with for p , a license can start with for m p. If the license starts with for m p, then the
body of the license is valid for m time periods of length p, but can be canceled at the end of any
period.
As an example, consider the license
for 3 100 pay 10.00 flatrate forW on D
4The original DigitalRights allows one to specify the time at which a client can activate a license. Roughly speaking,
we could capture this in our model by adding license activation as an action.
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where W is a set of works and D is a set of devices. This license allows the client to render any
work in W on a device in D by paying a flat rate of 10.00 at the end of every 100 time units, for 3
such time periods.
We can incorporate this license language in our logic by replacing our syntax for licenses (ℓ)
with expressions in the above language. To define the function L[[−]], which interprets licenses as
sets of traces in the semantics of our logic, we adapt the semantics of [Gunter, Weeks, and Wright
2001]. (The main difference is that we have a fixed time granularity, whereas the original semantics
uses real numbers as time stamps for events.)
To build up the function L[[−]], we first assign sets of traces to the simplest licenses, those that
are valid for a single period. The set of traces that allow for a payment of x to view works from W
on devices from D, for a period of p time units depends on the payment schedule. The traces for an
up front schedule is defined as:
UpFront(x, p,W,D) = {pay[x]a1 · · · ap−1 | ai is either ⊥ or render[w, d]
for some w ∈W and d ∈ D}.
The traces for a flat rate schedule is defined as:
FlatRate(x, p,W,D) = {a0 · · · ap−2pay[x] | ai is either ⊥ or render[w, d]
for some w ∈W and d ∈ D}.
The set of traces for a per use schedule is defined as:
PerUse(x, p,W,D) = {a0 · · · ap−2pay[nx] | ai is either ⊥ or render[w, d]
for some w ∈W and d ∈ D,
and n = |{ai | ai 6= ⊥}|}.
Given two sets of traces S1 and S2, we define S1 ·S2 as the set {s1 · s2 | s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2}. In other
words, S1 ·S2 is the set of all concatenation of traces from S1 and S2. We write Sn for S · S · . . . · S︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
.
Using the above definitions, we define the function L[[−]] as:
L[[for p z]] = M[[z]](p)
L[[for m p z]] = (M[[z]](p))m
L[[for uptom p z]] =
m⋃
n=0
(M[[z]](p))n,
where M[[−]] generates the traces for a single time period:
M[[pay x upfront forW on D]](p) = UpFront (x, p,W,D)
M[[pay x flatrate forW on D]](p) = FlatRate(x, p,W,D)
M[[pay x peruse forW on D]](p) = PerUse(x, p,W,D).
As expected, the semantics of the logic defined in Section 2 carries over verbatim with the above
changes.
The DigitalRights language given above is not more expressive than the regular one that we
introduced in Section 2. It is easy to see that for any license e in DigitalRights, the set of traces L[[e]]
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can be expressed by a regular language. Because the sets UpFront(x, p,W,D), FlatRate(x, p,W,D),
and PerUse(x, p,W,D) are finite for any p, x,W and D, it is trivial to express them using a regular
language. The concatenation operation S1 · S2 preserves regularity, as does union, therefore it is
possible to express any license expressed in DigitalRights as a regular one. There are, however,
advantages to using the DigitalRights language. The translation of a DigitalRights license yields a
large regular expression that may be significantly less efficient to verify than the original license.
Another benefit is that the DigitialRights language is easier to understand.
It should be noted that every license language is not necessarily subsumed by the language of
regular expressions. To see this, consider a license in some license language that can be canceled
whenever the number of renderings equals the number of payments. The set of traces corresponding
to such a license is not regular, by a well-known result from formal language theory (see for instance
[Hopcroft and Ullman 1969]). Therefore, any language that can be used to state this license is not
equivalent to any sublanguage of the regular expressions.
5 Related work
The inspiration for our work comes from the field of program verification, where one finds logics
such as Hoare Logic [Hoare 1969] and Dynamic Logic [Harel, Kozen, and Tiuryn 2000] to reason
about properties of programs. Our logic is similar to those, in the sense that our formulas contain
explicit licenses, in much the same way that theirs contain explicit programs. Logics of this type are
often referred to as exogenous. In contrast, endogenous logics do not explicitly mention programs;
to analyze a program with such a logic, one builds a model for that specific program, and uses
the logic to analyze the model. One advantage of using an exogenous logic is that it allows the
behavior of two programs to be compared within the logic. In our case, it allows us to compare the
effect of different licenses within the logic. An endogenous logic, however, permits more efficient
verification procedures. To get this benefit, our verification procedures in Section 3 essentially
convert formulas from our logic into formulas of an endogenous logic, viz. temporal logic.
Although our logic is an exogenous logic inspired by Dynamic Logic, its models are quite
different. In Dynamic Logic, programs guide the state transitions in the model. Licenses, on the
other hand, do not affect states. Instead, they are used to specify permissions and obligations. The
models of our logic are primarily influenced by the work of Halpern and van der Meyden [2001b] on
formalizing SPKI [Ellison, Frantz, Lampson, Rivest, Thomas, and Ylonen 1999]. SPKI is used to
account for access rights based on certificates received. Similarly, we base the right to do actions on
the licenses received. In fact, we could imagine licenses being implemented with SPKI certificates.
Permissions and obligations are key concepts in our approach. These notions are typically stud-
ied in the philosophical literature under the heading of deontic logic [Meyer and Wieringa 1993].
Early accounts of deontic logic failed to differentiate between actions and assertions, leading to
many paradoxical and counterintuitive propositions (see for instance [Follesdal and Hilpinen 1981]).
The idea of separating actions from assertions has lead to a recasting of deontic logic as a variant of
Dynamic Logic [Meyer 1988; Meyden 1990]. Models for deontic dynamic logics specify explicitly
either which states represent the violation of an obligation or a permission or which transitions are
permitted or forbidden. In [Meyer 1988], a special formula V is introduced in the logic, and any
state that satisfies V is deemed a violation. Intuitively, an action a is permitted in a state if it is pos-
sible to reach a state via a where V does not hold. Conversely, an action is obligatory if performing
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any other action leads to a state where V holds. In [Meyden 1990], it is the transitions between
states that are deemed permitted or forbidden. Llic is different from these approaches, because we
derive our permissions and obligations from the licenses issued in the run. This indirection means
that we do not have to explicitly model the permissions and obligations. In addition, we can easily
change the model to account for different licenses.
Finally, deontic logic has been used to reason about contracts. This is intriguing, because a
license can be viewed as a restricted form of contract. Research in this direction includes work by
Lee [1988], which focuses on developing a logical language based on predicate logic with temporal
operators. Deontic operators are handled using a specific predicate to represent a violation (in this
context, defaulting on a contract). Unfortunately, the logic is not meant to reason about contracts
written in some language. Instead, the models for the logic represent the contracts to be analyzed. In
other words, for each contract that he wants to study, Lee builds a specific model encoding violations
at the appropriate states.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a framework for precisely stating and rigorously proving properties
of licenses. We also have illustrated how our logic can be modified to reason about licenses that are
written in any language with a trace-based semantics. This flexibility provides us with a common
ground in which to compare different rights languages with trace-based semantics. We intend to
report on these comparisons in the future. While useful in its own right, the logic is a simple foun-
dation on which more expressive rights management logics can be built. For example, the logic can
be modified in a straightforward manner to support multiple clients and multiple providers. Multiple
providers is an especially interesting case, because it allows us to study the management of licensing
rights, the rights required for one provider to legitimately offer another provider’s work to a client.
We plan to examine various extension in the near future. There remain interesting questions about
the foundation of Llic , such as axiomatizations for the logic. Finally, as mentioned previously, our
operators P and O have a distinctly deontic flavor. It would be interesting to establish a correspon-
dence between our approach and existing deontic frameworks, in particular deontic logics of actions
[Khosla and Maibaum 1987; Meyer 1988; Meyden 1990].
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A Proofs
Proposition 2.1: For all action expressions (a, n), the formula P (a, n) ∨ P (a, n) is valid.
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Proof: The validity of this formula is a consequence of the fact that Pr(t) contains at least one
action corresponding to every license name n. Given a run r and a time t, and consider the action
expression (a, n). We know there must exist an action-name pair (b, n) in Pr(t). Two cases arise.
If a = b, then (a, n) is in both A[[(a, n)]] and Pr(t), and thus r, t |= P (a, n). If a 6= b, then (b, a) is
in both A[[(a, n)]] and Pr(t), and thus r, t |= P (a, n). Therefore, we have r, t |= P (a, n)∨P (a, n).
Since the above holds for all r and t, |= P (a, n) ∨ P (a, n).
Proposition 2.2: If r is a finite run and Nϕ ⊆ Nr, then r, t |= ϕ iff |= ψr ⇒ ©tϕ.
To simplify the proof, we introduce the following notation. Given runs r, r′, times t, t′, and a
subset N of Names , define (r, t) ≤N (r′, t′) if for all i ≥ 0, lic(r, t + i) ⊆ lic(r′, t′ + i) and
(act(r, t + i) ∩ (Act ×N)) = (act(r′, t′ + i) ∩ (Act ×N)). Intuitively, (r, t) ≤N (r′, t′) if every
license issued by r (starting at time t) is also issued in r′ (starting at time t′), and moreover the
two runs agree on the actions corresponding to license names in N . The following lemmas capture
the relevant properties of the ≤N relation. Recall that Nϕ is the set of license names appearing in
formula ϕ.
Lemma A.1: For any ϕ such that Nϕ ⊆ Nr, if (r, 0) ≤Nr (r′, t′), then r, i |= ϕ iff r′, t′ + i |= ϕ
for all i ≥ 0.
Proof: By induction on the structure of ϕ. We prove the nontrivial cases here. Consider ϕ = n : ℓ.
If r, i |= n : ℓ, then (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, i) ⊆ lic(r′, t′ + i), and hence r′, t′ + i |= n : ℓ. Conversely,
if r′, t′ + i |= n : ℓ, then since Nϕ ⊆ Nr, license name n must appear in r, and by definition of
(r, 0) ≤Nr (r
′, t′) and the fact that license names can be associated with only one license in a run,
it must be the case that (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, i). Hence, r, i |= n : ℓ. The cases for (a, n) and (a, n)
follow from r and r′ agreeing on the actions for license names n ∈ Nϕ ⊆ Nr. For P (a, n) and
P (a, n), because r and r′ agree on the licenses issued with name n ∈ Nϕ ⊆ Nr, and because r
and r′ agree on the actions pertaining to license name n, Pr and Pr′ agree on the permissions with
respect to license name n, from which the result follows. The remaining cases are a straightforward
application of the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma A.2: r′, t′ |= ψr iff (r, 0) ≤Nr (r′, t′).
Proof: We know by definition that r′, t′ |= ψr if and only if r′, t′ |= ψ0, r′, t′ + 1 |= ψ1, . . . ,
r′, t′ + tf |= ψtf , and r, t′ + t |= ψe for all t > tf . Given the definition of ψ0, . . . , ψtf and ψe, this
is equivalent to lic(r, 0) ⊆ lic(r′, t′), . . . , lic(r, tf ) ⊆ lic(r′, t′ + tf ), lic(r, t) = ∅ ⊆ lic(r′, t′ + t)
for t > tf , and moreover r(i) and r′(t′+ i) agree on the actions pertaining to license names n ∈ Nr
for all i ≥ 0. This just says that (r, 0) ≤Nr (r′, t′).
Proof: (Proposition 2.2) Note that r, t |= ϕ iff r, 0 |= ©tϕ. Thus, it is sufficient to show that
r, 0 |= ϕ iff |= ψr ⇒ ϕ.
First, assume that (r, 0) |= ϕ. Let r′, t′ be an arbitrary run and time. If r′, t′ |= ψr, then
by Lemma A.2, (r, 0) ≤Nr (r′, t′). Since Nϕ ⊆ Nr, Lemma A.1 implies that r′, t′ |= ϕ. This
establishes that r′, t′ |= ψr ⇒ ϕ. Since r′, t′ was arbitrary, |= ψr ⇒ ϕ holds.
For the converse direction, assume that |= ψr ⇒ ϕ. In particular, r, 0 |= ψr ⇒ ϕ. Since
(r, 0) ≤Nr (r, 0), Lemma A.2 implies that r, 0 |= ψr, and hence r, 0 |= ϕ.
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Proposition 2.3: For any license ℓ, the formulas n : ℓ⇒ ϕin,ℓ are valid, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof: The proof relies on a suitable application of standard properties of regular expressions, and
much formal symbolic manipulation. We sketch the argument here. First, extend the definition of
S to handle more than a single action. Let Sk(ℓ) (for k ≥ 1) be the function that returns the set
of all prefixes of length k of action sequences associated with ℓ. Formally, S1(ℓ) = S(ℓ), and
Sk+1 = {aσ : a ∈ S(ℓ), σ ∈ Sk(Da(ℓ))}.
Given this definition, we can verify that the formula ϕi+1n,ℓ is equivalent to ϕin,ℓ ∧ϕ
i 7→i+1
n,ℓ , where
ϕi 7→i+1n,ℓ is the formula ∧
a0···ai+1∈
Si+2(ℓ)
(
((a0, n) ∧©(a1, n) ∧ · · ·
∧©i(ai, n)
)
⇒ ©i+1P (ai+1, n)
)
.
Let r, t be an arbitrary run and time. We show by induction that r, t |= n : ℓ⇒ ϕin,ℓ for all i ≥ 0.
Assume r, t |= n : ℓ, that is, (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t). The base case of the induction is verified by noticing
that ϕ0n,ℓ =
∧
a∈S(ℓ) P (a, n), and by the definition of Pr(t), for all a ∈ S(ℓ), (a, n) ∈ Pr(t),
so that r, t |= P (a, n). The induction step follows by a similar reasoning. Assume r, t |= ϕin,ℓ.
Given the above equivalence, it is sufficient to show that r, t |= ϕi 7→i+1n,ℓ to establish the result. For
any a0 · · · ai+1 ∈ Si+2(ℓ), if r, t |= (a0, n) ∧ ©(a1, n) ∧ · · · ∧ ©i(ai, n), then r, t |= (a0, n),
r, t+1 |= (a1, n), . . . , r, t+ i |= (ai, n). Since a0 · · · aiai+1 ∈ Si+2(ℓ), it is viable for ℓ, and hence
(ai+1, n) ∈ Pr(t+ i+1), that is, r, t+ i+1 |= P (ai+1, n), or r, t |= ©i+1P (ai+1, n), as required.
Since this is true for all sequences in Si+2(ℓ), we have r, t |= ϕi 7→i+1n,ℓ , establishing our result.
Proposition 3.1: r, t |= ϕ iff Mr, st |=L ϕT .
Proof: We prove by induction on the structure of ϕ that for all t, r, t |= ϕ iff Mr, st |=L ϕT . We
give a few representative cases here, the remaining cases being similar.
Consider ϕ = n : ℓ. For any t, we have r, t |= n : ℓ iff (n, ℓ) ∈ lic(r, t) iff issued(n, ℓ) ∈ L(st)
(by construction of L(st)) iff Mr, st |=L issued(n, ℓ).
Consider ϕ = P (a, n). For any t, we have r, t |= P (a, n) iff (b, n) ∈ Pr(t) for some b 6= a
iff obligated(a, n) is not in L(st) (since (a, n) cannot be the unique action in Pr(t)) iff Mr, st |=L
¬obligated(a, n).
Consider ϕ = ©ϕ′. For any t, we have r, t |= ©ϕ′ iff r, t+ 1 |= ϕ′ iff Mr, st+1 |=L (ϕ′)T (by
hypothesis) iff Mr, st |=L X(ϕ′)T , and X(ϕ′)T = ϕT .
Proposition 3.2: If M,s |=L ϕT ∧ ϕI , then there exists a run r such that r, 0 |= ϕ.
Proof: Without loss of generality, M = (S,L) with S = {s0, s1, . . . }, and s = s0. (If not, s = st
for some t, and take M ′ = (S′, L) where S′ = {st, st+1, . . . }, and we can check that M ′, s0 |=L
ϕT∧ϕI .) Construct the run rM as follows: for all t ≥ 0, rM (t) = (LM (t), AM (t)), where LM (t) =
{(n, ℓ) : issued(n, ℓ) ∈ L(st)}, and AM (t)(n) = a if done(a, n) ∈ L(st), and AM (t)(n) = ⊥
otherwise. This is a well-defined run, because Mr, s0 satisfies DoneAϕ,Nϕ and IssuedLϕ . We next
check that for all t ≥ 0, PrM (t) = {(a, n) : permitted(a, n) ∈ LM (st)}. The details are routine,
if tedious. Essentially, every path through the automaton encoded in NFAn,ℓ,Aϕ corresponds to a
viable trace of the license ℓ from the point where the license is issued. A straightforward proof by
induction establishes that rM , 0 |= ϕ.
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Theorem 3.3: The satisfiability problem for Llic is PSPACE-complete.
Proof: For the lower bound, we show that we can reduce the satisfiability problem for LTL to
the satisfiability problem for Llic . Let F be a formula of LTL, over primitive propositions Φf =
{p1, . . . , pn}. We first rewrite F into a formula ϕF of Llic , by picking an arbitrary non-⊥ action in
Act (call it ⋆) and a name np for every p ∈ Φf , and replacing every primitive proposition p in F
by the action expression (⋆, np), and replacing G, X, and U by ✷, ©, and U respectively. Assume
F is satisfiable in a linear structure M = (S,L) at state si, where S = (s0, s1, . . . ). Let rM be
the run defined by rM (t) = (∅, A(t)), where A(t) maps name np to action ⋆ if p ∈ L(st), and
to ⊥ otherwise, and maps all other names to ⊥. It is easy to check that ϕF is satisfiable in rM at
time i. Similarly, if ϕF is satisfiable in a run r at time t, we can convert r into a linear structure
Mr = (S,L), where p ∈ L(st) iff (⋆, np) ∈ act(r, t), and it is easy to check that F is satisfiable in
Mr at state st. Since the satisfiability problem for LTL is PSPACE-complete, the above reduction
means that the satisfiability problem for Llic is PSPACE-hard.
For the upper bound, we show that we can reduce the satisfiability problem for Llic to the
satisfiability problem for LTL in polynomial time. In particular, we show that ϕ is satisfiable in Llic
iff ϕT ∧ ϕI is satisfiable in LTL. Let ϕ be a formula satisfied in run r at time t. By Proposition 3.1,
Mr, st |=L ϕ
T
. By construction, it is clear that Mr, st |=L ϕI (only one action per license per
time, no two licenses with the same name ever issued, and so on). Hence, Mr, st |=L ϕT ∧ ϕI .
Conversely, assume that ϕT ∧ ϕI is satisfiable in a linear structure M . By Proposition 3.2, there
exists a run r such that r, 0 |= ϕ, i.e., ϕ is satisfiable in Llic . Finally, one can check that the size of
the formula ϕT ∧ ϕI is polynomial in the size of ϕ.
Proposition 3.4: There exists a polynomial time algorithm for computing the interpretation Pr
corresponding to a finite run r.
Proof: It is clearly sufficient to define Pr for non-⊥ actions only, by taking ⊥ to be the default
value of Pr. Let Lr be the set of named licenses issued in run r. We define, for every named license
(n, ℓ) ∈ Lr, a function Pr,n that gives for every time t the set of actions permitted by the named
license (n, ℓ) at time t. Clearly, we can then take Pr(t) =
⋃
(n,ℓ)∈Lr
Pr,n(t).
Consider a named license (n, ℓ) ∈ Lr, and assume (n, ℓ) is issued at time t0 in r. Let A =
(Q, I,∆, F ) be the ǫ-free NFA corresponding to the regular expression ℓ, where Q is the set of
states, I is the set of initial states, ∆ is the transition relation, and F is the set of final states. We can
construct A in time polynomial in the size of ℓ, using [Hromkovic, Seibert, and Wilke 1997], where
|Q| is linear in the size of ℓ and |∆| is less than quadratic.
We can now define the function Pr,n. For t < t0, we can take Pr,n(t) = {⊥}. For t ≥ t0,
we need to take the license into consideration. First, define the sequence of sets S0, S1, . . . , Sm−t0
where m is the length of run r. These sets represents the sets of states of the NFA obtained by
following the actions related to license name n prescribed by the run. Formally, define Si inductively
as:
S0 = I
Si+1 = {s
′ : (s, a, s′) ∈ ∆ for some
s ∈ Si and (a, n) ∈ act(r, t0 + i)}.
With these sets, we define Pr,n(t0 + i) =
⋃
s∈Si
{a : ∃s′.(s, a, s′) ∈ ∆}, that is, the set of actions
that can be performed according to license ℓ starting from any of the states in Si. One can check
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that the sets Si can be constructed in polynomial time, and therefore that Pr,n, and hence Pr, can be
constructed in polynomial time.
Theorem 3.5: There exists an algorithm for deciding if a formula ϕ is true in a finite run r at time
t. Furthermore, the algorithm runs in polynomial time with respect to the size of the model r and in
exponential time with respect to the size of the formula ϕ.
Proof: Given a run r, we can compute Pr in polynomial time by Proposition 3.4, and construct the
model Mr in time polynomial in the size of r. We can translate ϕ into ϕT in time polynomial in the
size of the formula. We use Proposition 3.1 to reduce the problem to the model-checking problem
for LTL, which can be solved in time polynomial in the size of the Mr and exponential in the size
of ϕ (see, for instance, [Vardi 1997]).
Proposition 3.6: r |= ϕ iff Mr, s0 |=L G(ϕT ).
Proof: By definition, r |= ϕ iff for all times t, r, t |= ϕ. By Proposition 3.1, this holds iff for all
states st of Mr, Mr, st |= ϕT , which just means that Mr, s0 |= GϕT .
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